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ABSTRACT
The Prisma smallsat in-orbit test-bed was launched on the 15th of June, 2010 to demonstrate strategies and
technologies for formation flying and rendezvous. The mission consists of two spacecraft: Mango and Tango.
Mango is 3-axis stabilized and is equipped with a propulsion system providing full 3D orbit control capability.
Tango has a simplified solar magnetic control system and does not have any orbit control capability. The two
spacecraft were launched clamped together into a 720/780 km altitude sun synchronous dawn-dusk orbit, and later
separated in August of 2010. Since then, the two spacecraft, and rather lean operations team, have been performing
a steady march through a tight mission and experiment timeline.
This paper gives an overview of the Prisma mission in general and will focus on the lessons that have been learned
from running a relatively intense, yet lean, small satellite technology demonstration mission. It has proven to show
the value of autonomy and small platform applications, allowing for a high return on effort.
Spacecraft autonomy and small, highly competent teams have allowed for quick and cost effective adaptations to
changes and problem situations. The broad range of flight results from only one year in operation support these
conclusions.
INTRODUCTION

MISSION DESCRIPTION

The Prisma mission is a technology demonstration
mission with the primary purpose of demonstrating
formation flying and rendezvous technology, both in
terms of Guidance, Navigation and Control (GNC)
software and algorithms, but also in terms of new
instruments and operational aspects.

Demonstration and timeline
The figure below is a summary of the space segment
hardware that constitutes the Prisma mission.

Prisma consists of two spacecraft: Mango and Tango.
Both spacecraft are 3-axis stabilized where Mango uses
a traditional star-tracker / reaction wheel based control
system, while Tango implements solar magnetic
stabilization strategy1. Mango is equipped with full 3D
orbit control capability while Tango does not have any
means of controlling its orbit, acting as a rendezvous
target for Mango. The mission also acts as a
demonstration flight for several other key technologies
and developments at OHB Sweden and SSC, of which
the new “High Performance Green Propellant”
propulsion system is the most important.

Figure 1, Prisma space segment summary
The above space segment hardware is thus intended to
support the defined mission to demonstrate formation
flight and rendezvous, whilst also providing “first
flight” opportunities for a number of new sensor and
actuator technologies. Thus demonstrations can be
divided in to GNC Experiments and Hardware Tests.

OHB Sweden is the prime contractor for the project
which is funded by the Swedish National Space Board
(SNSB) with additional support from the German
Aerospace Center (DLR), the French National Space
Center (CNES) and the Technical University of
Denmark (DTU).
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The two tables below list all of the intended GNC and
hardware demonstrations.
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GNC Experiment Demonstrations

Hardware Flight Demonstrations
HPGP Motor Tests

Passive formation flying
Autonomous formation flying (AFF)

OHB Sweden

ECAPS

Microthruster Motor Tests

Nanospace

Autonomous formation control (AFC)

DLR

Relative GPS receivers

DLR

RF-based formation flying

CNES

Vision Based Sensor (VBS)

DTU

RF Sensor Tests

Forced motion
Proximity Operations (PROX)
Final Approach and Recede (FARM)
Forced RF-based motion
Collision avoidance

OHB Sweden

PRIMA MEMs mass analyzer
CNES

Autonomous Rendezvous (ARV)

CNES

LEON-3 on-board processor

Digital Video System

OHB Sweden
IRF
Techno Systems

Table 2, H/W experiments and responsible
organization2

OHB Sweden

Table 1, GNC experiments and responsible
organization2

Figure 2, Basic mission timeline, from Mango/Tango separation

Every row in the above timeline represents an allocated
experiment slot and within these slots there may also
exist secondary (“passenger”) experiments that are not
shown. The result is that between each experiment,
there is a handover involving a required experiment
validation, post-condition, and pre-condition. Due to the
short ten-month mission time, a high degree of
responsiveness has been required from both mission
control as well as the experimenters themselves.

misunderstood over voice only contact. This led to a
restructuring of the concept, where the operator was
also moved to the MCC.
The operations team was built using almost exclusively
engineers with significant experience from the
development and test phases of the satellites. This
approach meant that little focus on platform training
had to be done during preparations and more time could
be used for pure operational training.

With the exception of a few +/-days, the project has
followed the timeline as originally planned.

The team is split into three separate functions: Operator,
GNC expert and Flight director. Their responsibilities
are as shown in the table below.

Operational Concept
The original plan for operations planning was to utilize
two control centers: one Operational Control Center in
Kiruna, Sweden, where command operators would be
stationed, and one Mission Control Center (MCC) in
Stockholm, where mission experts would plan and lead
the mission. Early operational rehearsals showed that
many of the mission phases would be difficult using
this approach as communication between the operator
and mission control proved too slow and too easily
Pokrupa

Role
Operator
GNC Expert
Flight Director

Responsibilities
- Commanding
- Data archiving
- Attitude and Orbit control
- Experiment validation & support
- Passage planning
- Platform monitoring
- Anomaly handling

Table 3, Operational team responsibilities
2
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During the LEOP and commissioning phases of the
mission 3-shift operations was used to perform the
platform checkouts in a rapid fashion. When going into
the basic mission after Tango separation, operations
were reduced to only two shifts as from that point most
experiments were closed-loop and less active
commanding had to occur.

Experiment process

Prior to launch an agreement was made with DLR
GSOC to transfer operations to Munich for part of the
extended mission when a large part of the DLR
experiments were to take place. In preparation for this
MCC was cloned at GSOC and training of the DLR
operations team was performed in the Stockholm
control room where DLR engineers took the role of
operators for hands-on training to learn about both the
platform and the operational concept employed during
the mission.

Experiment
Definition

Experiment
Program Draft
Feedback
Simulation

GNC
Validation

For the basic mission only one ground station was used
(Kiruna), leading to operations during night-time due to
the dawn-dusk orbit of Prisma. After operations
handover to GSOC a further two ground stations were
qualified for use, Weilheim in Germany and Inuvik in
Canada. With 3 stations available operations could be
moved to daytime, significantly reducing the load on
the operations team.

Script
Generation

Platform
Validation

Previous
Experiment
Experiment
Readiness
Review

Transfer to
Initial
Conditions

Verify Inital
Conditions

External experiments have been provided with on-site
facilities to access real-time data to be able to gauge the
progress of their experiments as they are being
executed. Data is also delivered to an external datastore, accessible over the internet, with data typically
being available within 1 hour from being downloaded
from the spacecraft if the experimenter wants to
monitor remotely.

Experiment
Execution

Experiment
Results

Transfer to
Next
Experiment

Input to Next
Experiment Slot

Figure 3, Experiment process

The ground segment in MCC has been based on the inhouse developed RAMSES3 mutli-satellite control
system, augmented by additional tools developed in
Matlab.

Close cooperation between experimenters and the
Prisma GNC experts has been employed since well
before launch. This is especially true for those partners
(CNES & DLR) who provide separate GNC modes for
use in closed-loop formation flying.

The same ground segment has been used throughout the
development and testing phases of the Prisma satellites,
with development of RAMSES occurring in parallel.
This has meant that the maturity of the ground segment
has grown alongside the space segment, with new
features being added as they have been needed.

The simulator, SATSIM4, is an advanced, multi-satellite
simulator capable of running either all-soft, faster than
real-time, or with hardware in the loop at real-time
execution. This simulator has been used extensively
throughout the entire development and test phase of
Prisma, as well as for operational training and flight
procedure validation.

RAMSES has been developed to allow ease of
configuration in the operations environment. All
applications run on standard Windows PCs, connected
to a local area network. This has meant that applications
can easily be moved from one computer to another and
inserting additional computers into the operational
environment has been very simple as need has arisen.

Pokrupa

Mission Timeline

With so many different kinds of experiments, most of
which affect the orbit of Mango, it has been necessary
to establish a validation process for the experiments. An
overview of this process can be seen in figure 3. This
process relies heavily on the use of simulations of the
experiments to be able to predict the result and to
ascertain that the planned maneuvers do not risk the
safety of the constellation.

All experiments affecting either orbit or attitude of
either spacecraft are run through the all-soft version of
SATSIM, with the result being analyzed by both the
experimenter and GNC experts. This is then iterated
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several times until the experimenter is satisfied and the
time of the experiment execution is drawing close.

region of where the prior one ended, though in most
cases some type of transfer between the two has been
necessary. This transfer has been calculated by the
operational team and executed using the AFF mode.

The experiments are specified in XML-format,
containing lists of commands and static procedures.
Once the GNC validation is complete the XML is
translated to PLUTO-scripts, which can be sent to the
spacecraft. Before execution the scripts are validated
for syntax and command verification by uploading them
to the real-time simulator, which contains engineering
models of the processors of both Mango and Tango.

After the initial conditions have been verified the
experiment is executed, monitored by both the Prisma
operational team and the experimenter themselves. The
data from the validation of the experiment is used as a
reference, allowing near instant verification on the
progress of the experiment.

If the experiment requires any specific monitoring
during its execution this is also stated in the XML and
the monitoring plan is automatically implemented into
the operational environment.

EXPERIMENT RESULTS SUMMARY
Over the course of the mission a large variety of
relative orbits have been flown, with distances ranging
from 2m to 30km in along-track separation, up to
1000m cross-track and to 2km radial distance. Figure 4
shows how the norm of the distance has varied over the
basic mission.

The timeline has to a large extent been planned such
that the initial conditions of one experiment is in the
5
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Figure 4, Relative distance over time up to 2011-06-01
AFF – To date, 5 months of closed loop cooperative
satellite formation flying, with 20 days in dedicated
AFF experiments. The remaining time has been spent
in routine operational formation flight between 30km to
10m relative distances.5

DLR – First comprehensive demonstration of GPS
based autonomous formation flight and extraction of
relative Precision Orbit Determination (POD).9
ECAPS – First flight and space qualification of the
High Performance Green Propellant (HPGP) 1N
thruster system, including 34,000 pulses during 200 test
sequences and 2.3 hours of firing.10

PROX/GPS – First flight demonstration of close
proximity GPS based forced motion relative orbit
control over the range of 50m to as low as 2m relative
distances.6

Nanospace – First flight of the MEMS cold gas
micropropulsion system.
Electrical validation of
control hardware was possible, although unfortunately
full system demonstration could not be performed due
to a propellant leak two days in to the mission.

ARV – First flight demonstration of autonomous lineof-sight only based target search, orbit determination,
orbit align and approach from 30km to 50m relative
distances.7

PRIMA – First flight demonstration of MEMS shutter
based low energy (<100eV) ion mass analyzer.11

CNES – First flight demonstration of autonomous
formation flight using a radio electric relative sensor.
Position accuracy was achieved in the range of 1100cm and pointing accuracies of <0.1o over the range
of 30km to 3m relative distances.8
Pokrupa

PROX/VBS – At the time of writing the first closed
loop proximity operations based on visual sensor were
taking place. Results are yet to be analyzed.
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2.

PRISMA AUTONOMY
Designing GNC for Autonomous Formation Flight
The design of the GNC subsystem of Prisma is
primarily focused on maintaining the safety of the
formation. As Tango does not have any maneuver
capability all functionality for formation keeping has
been implemented onboard Mango. Tango aids this by
continuously providing GPS measurements.
Onboard Mango formation safety is paramount; all
modes except for Safe Sun contain functionality for
maintaining the formation. Among these the
Autonomous Formation Flying (AFF)12 has been
designated as baseline to be used throughout the
mission, as can be seen in figure 5.

The relative positions are maintained within a defined
“control box” which allows the operations team to
define the range of acceptable control error on the
requested relative distances. The iteration time for this
control loop can also be defined for a faster control
loop. For instance, during the 2m approach on the 25 th
of January, 2011, the control period was set to 150s and
box to a demanding [0.3 0.3 0.2] meters. 6

Safe Sun

While AFF has been the default go-to mode during gaps
between experiments both modes have been used as
Safe Orbit Guidance is faster at establishing a safe
relative orbit while performing proximity operations as
no transfer needs to be calculated. It has also been used
in cases where there has been a large cross-track
separation to conserve fuel when that distance is
expected to be brought back down within a short timeframe by another experiment.

Safe Celstial

Manual

AFF

DLR

CNES

PROX

ARV

FARM

Running in the background in all modes are the
collision and evaporation detectors. These functions
continuously monitor the formation, ensuring that no
experiment runs the risk of either colliding with Tango
or going too far away and thus risk losing contact.

Figure 5, GNC Mode overview, solid lines indicate
transitions by command only, dashed autonomous
or commanded transitions
AFF has been chosen for this role as it is the most
flexible of the modes, providing capability for both
autonomously establishing stable T-periodic orbits and
for reconfiguring the relative orbit for transfers between
experiments.

The collision detector is configurable by mode,
allowing different experiments to approach to separate
distances. Collision detection for Prisma is a
combination of contact computation when they are very
close, as is possible during the approach and recede
experiment, and predictive collision monitoring for
modes when the spacecraft are far enough apart that
they may be modeled as spheres.

In Safe Celestial formation safety is handled by Safe
Orbit Guidance13, which has the express purpose of
establishing a safe relative orbit. This is done by
ensuring that the along-track distance is safe and that
both cross-track and radial distances are >0.

Upon detection of a possible collision or evaporation a
transition to Safe Celestial will be requested, where the
Safe Orbit Guidance will attempt to deal with the
situation.

AFF consists of two main parts:
1.

A ground support toolbox. The AFF Toolbox is
used to specify requirements on the relative orbit
and with the help of an optimizer a relative
trajectory is calculated that fulfills the
requirements using a fixed number of delta-Vs.
The toolbox is used by the flight dynamics team
to plan and optimize transfers between different
orbits.

Pokrupa

Onboard guidance and control software. The
AFF software onboard is a smaller version of the
ground support toolbox. It is using a Model
Predictive Control framework to compute
required maneuvers to achieve and maintain the
trajectory specified by ground. The AFF can be
used to execute, in closed loop, a trajectory
uniquely specified by ground, achieve a goal
trajectory autonomously in a certain time or
achieve the closest T-periodic orbit from the
current state.

Over the course of the mission AFF has indeed been the
work-horse for formation-flying, nearly 50% of the
mission timeline has been spent in the mode, as can be
seen in figure 6.
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other experiments. It has, for example, been extensively
used for standby orbits during proximity experiments
and has also been the default mode used during FFRF
sensor validation before the CNES GNC Closed-loop
experiments.

Manual
AFC
SafeSun

CNES

The large amount of time spent in Manual mode is
explained by the fact that all HPGP experiments use
this mode as the objective for these tests is not
formation flying but qualification of new thruster
technology.

PROX VBS
ARV
PROX GPS

SafeCelestial

The relatively small amount of time spent in proximity
operations is due to the short duration of such forced
motion experiments. Between experiment sets AFF has
been used to maintain a close relative position while
conserving fuel and minimizing risk of collision.

AFF

Figure 6, relative use of GNC modes after Tango
Separation, as of 2011-06-01

The tightly packed timeline has resulted in large
amounts of mode switches, mostly between AFF and
higher modes. Figure 7 shows how the mode has
changed since the start of the Basic Mission.

AFF has not only been used for transfers and dedicated
AFF experiments, it has also been employed during

PROX VBS
PROX GPS
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Manual
AFF
Safe Celestial
Safe Sun
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Figure 7, GNC Mode in flight up to 2011-06-01

Metric

Value

Number of days in closed loop AFF

136

Number of AFF formation reconfigurations

122

Number of times used AFF auto T-periodic

47

Closest distance in AFF

10 m

Farthest distance in AFF

30 000 m

Failure Detection, Isolation and Recovery
An important factor in allowing the use of a small
operational team has been the implementation of a
robust, well tested and configurable Failure Detection,
Isolation and Recovery (FDIR) system.
FDIR on Prisma has been designed to encapsulate the
software application cores, allowing all cores to provide
input but having spacecraft configuration take place
outside their basic functionality. The encapsulation is
implemented through two components; the System
FDIR (FSYS), performing data validation, and the

Table 4, AFF usage until 2011-06-01

Pokrupa
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Application FDIR (FAPP), controlling the spacecraft
configuration. See the figure below.

recovery while others do not. The most commonly used
configuration, however, is that of a cold redundant
hardware unit, where the possible actions are as listed
in table 6.

Sensors

Action
Mark as invalid
FSYS
Data validation

Set active branch
Flag branch A as unhealthy

Valid sensor data

Flag branch B as unhealthy

Application Cores

Force switch to redundant processor

GNC
ORB
Actuators

Unit Validity

Command branch A on

Error Detection

Thermal

Command branch B on
Power

Reset error state

Table 6, Unit recovery actions

Error Detection

The actions are defined as a vector of true/false flags
for each severity level. Default behavior is typically to
flag the current branch as unhealthy, switch to the other
branch and resetting the error to allow the redundant
unit to be used in the control-loop. A subsequent failure
on the redundant branch leads to a switch to the
redundant processor.

FAPP
Configuration

Spacecraft
Configuration

Figure 8, FDIR encapsulation
All sensor data is processed in FSYS on a rudimentary
level, assuring that e.g. data has been delivered as
expected and that all Remote Terminal Units (RTUs)
are performing within specification. The early
validation of data done by FSYS ensures that no invalid
data is passed on to the other software cores, preventing
autonomous decisions being taken on invalid data. This
data is then processed by each separate application core
and application specific error detection is made. Any
detected error is immediately classified based on
severity and is then forwarded to FAPP, which then
carries out recovery actions based on the severity level.
If a unit is declared as invalid by FAPP the FSYS may
not override this decision.

Each step of the FDIR approach is configurable in flight
without requiring software patching. Detection levels
for faults can be tuned, as well as severity levels. In
addition to this the requested recovery action can also
be configured easily. This has proven to be a very
useful approach, for example during the commissioning
of the spacecraft redundant units could be checked out
by reconfiguring the FDIR such that any detected errors
would have simply caused a switch to the nominal
branch instead of progressing further to more severe
recovery actions.
Another example of the strength of the configurability
of the FDIR has been the handling of the onboard GPS
receivers. Due to the risk of radiation caused singleevents the FDIR was initially reconfigured to switch the
receiver off in the case of an upset, instead of switching
to the redundant branch. This was done to be able to
monitor a restart of the GPS during ground visibility to
be able to verify that the receiver was still working
nominally. Following a series of on-ground tests it was
established that the single-events did not pose a danger
to the hardware and the recovery actions were again
reconfigured. The current recovery is to perform a
power-cycling of the receiver as soon as a probable
radiation-event has been detected. This has proven to be
a safe implementation which minimizes the time
without GPS navigation on-board and thus reduces the
impact of the phenomenon on the ongoing experiments.
As of the time of writing close to 60 restarts due to

Error detection severity is classified according to the
following table:
Severity class

Interpretation

0

No error

1

Invalid

2

Anomaly

3

Failure

Table 5, Error severity classification
FAPP has one configuration setting for each of the
severity levels, defining which state the unit is to be set
to and which configuration is to be done. Depending on
the unit the available recovery actions may differ
slightly, some may have a mode switch available as a
Pokrupa
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suspected radiation events have occurred with no
discernable decrease in performance of the receivers.

As the system TTIM does not reset unless a reboot is
performed it has become a very useful tool to track fuel
consumption. The development of the TTIM over the
mission can be seen in figure 9.

Through the separation of spacecraft configuration from
error detection in the encapsulated way done on Prisma,
the testability of the error detection at application level
has greatly increased. This has had the added bonus of
increasing confidence in the spacecraft autonomy,
allowing the operational team to focus on the mission
itself, instead of continuously doing routine health
checks best left to automated processes.

System TTIM [s]

5000

Total Thruster Impulse Monitoring
With many different controllers requesting the use of
delta V for orbit reconfiguration an maintenance it is
important to be able to detect excessive thrusting during
all phases of the mission. For Prisma this is done by the
Total Thruster Impulse Monitors (TTIMs), which
monitors the accumulated on-time of the thrusters.
Impulse monitoring is done in two separate locations of
the OBSW, in GNC and on system level. These two
each have separate detection limits and recovery actions
associated to them and essentially serve two different
purposes.

3000
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Figure 9, System level total thrust on-time

MISSION EVENT EXAMPLES
Considering the above described Prisma mission and
operational architecture, the following three mission
events serve well for case studies from in-flight
experience.

The GNC TTIM has two detection limits, the lower
limit leading to a switch to AFF while the higher leads
to a transition to Safe/Celestial. This allows the GNC
Core to monitor any ongoing experiment and recover to
a safe state if the experiment exceeds its expected
deltaV. Both levels can be tuned to correspond to the
ongoing experiment, using input from the validation,
and the limit can be reset prior to each new experiment.

Case Study 1: Autonomous collision avoidance
Near the end of the AFF completion experiment slot,
time was allocated for preparations for VBS close range
activities. The purpose was to further characterize the
camera and how it could be employed as part of the
control-loop for PROX/FARM experiments further
along in the mission.

The system TTIM checks the accumulated on-time
since the last reboot of the spacecraft. Instead of, like
the GNC TTIM, working with the calculated on-time it
monitors the on-time actually sent to the thrusters. This
gives an added safety as it is completely independent of
the GNC control loop. The TTIM level is periodically
raised to account for the ongoing experiments.
Recovery from a system TTIM triggering is the
complete shut-down of the thruster system, including
power-down of the thruster electronics.

Specific experiments were set up, using AFF to go
closer to Tango to acquire images and check
performance for the VBS. The experiment was
configured to keep Mango at a distance of 15-20m from
Tango, while Tango was set to rotate to be able to view
all panels of the smaller satellite.
The experiment ran smoothly for some time, before the
collision detector requested a recovery as the distance
was too small.

Managing the TTIMs is in most cases done in parallel,
i.e. a reset of the GNC TTIM is paired with a
simultaneous rising of the system TTIM. This approach
allows for consecutively harsher recovery actions as
each level is exceeded: An experiment consuming too
much fuel will be aborted and AFF will attempt to
establish a T-periodic orbit. If this fails Safe Orbit
Guidance will attempt to stop any drift and realize a
safe relative orbit. Should this also fail the thruster
system will be shut down and mission control needs to
take additional recovery actions.
Pokrupa
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In the figure below the along-track position (green)
follows the AFF reference (blue) quite well for several
orbits, but the error gets larger and larger as time goes
on.
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later date allowed the necessary data to be gathered
successfully.
10

As the navigation indicated a much too small separation
than desired the collision avoidance maneuver was
necessary, albeit unfortunate.

0
-10

Case Study 2: Safe Mode recovery with assisted
autonomy

-20

Part of the CNES closed-loop experiment „FFRF
GNC2‟ included an approach to 50m separation,
followed by proximity operations from that point and
closer. The experiment is then ended with a drift away
from Tango. The simulated validation result of the
experiment can be seen in figure 12.

-30
Anomaly
23
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Time [h] from 2011-04-12

26

Figure 10, AFF reference (blue) vs relative position
(green) [m]
400

As long as the actual relative position is within the AFF
control box it will continue to try to correct for the
measured error, which it does for a while. However, at
just before 2AM (at the red line in figures 10 and 11)
the measured relative position violated the collision
detector setting and a transition to safe mode was
performed.

300
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After the mode transition, Safe Orbit Guidance
immediately performed recovery actions by performing
a 8.5s long thrust to increase the along-track distance.
Shortly thereafter an additional thrust was performed to
establish a safe ellipse around Tango. The resulting
orbit can be seen in figure 11.

-200
-300
20
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Due to the need of a transfer maneuver to the initial
conditions for the experiment, the start was delayed by
one orbit compared to the simulation, but the sequence
started nominally.

600
400

After the initial approach to 50m an anomaly occurred
with one of the secondary experiments, which
unfortunately affected the primary experiment by
causing a mode switch to Safe Celestial. This switch led
to the ongoing experiment being aborted in favor of
recovery actions. As the orbit at that time completely
lacked both cross-track and radial components, the Safe
Orbit Guidance deemed it unsafe and performed a
maneuver to safe-guard the constellation. The new orbit
had a relative distance of up to 500m, with substantial
cross-track and radial components, quite far from where
the experiment was planned to be.

200
0
Anomaly
22

24
26
Time [h] from 2011-04-12

28

Figure 11, Establishing a safe orbit after collision
avoidance (along-track, cross-track & radial [m]).
Investigation into the cause of the diverging along-track
separation showed the cause to be poor navigation due
to the rotation of Tango. The incorrect Mango
navigation settings to account for the rotation were used
during the execution. Using a more robust setting at a
Pokrupa
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Figure 12, Expected relative distance (along-track,
cross-track and radial [m]), simulation result
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The anomaly was detected in passage 3664, where
some immediate actions were taken to investigate why
the mode switch occurred and to ascertain that neither
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primary nor secondary experiments had suffered any
form of permanent effects. As it caused the primary
experiment to be aborted it was categorized as a major
anomaly, possibly affecting the mission timeline.

Case Study 3: Safe Mode entry due to improper
experiment validation
Due to the small team-size, the GNC-experts have often
been forced to take on the role of both experimenter and
GNC-responsible. For most of the mission this has been
a workable, albeit taxing, solution, but there have been
a few instances where the two roles have come in
conflict and experiments have suffered from it.

Analysis quickly showed that the primary experiment
was ok, but the secondary experiment would require
some additional investigation. The decision was taken
to attempt to restart the primary experiment, but without
the secondary.

The most serious of these instances occurred when what
was supposed to be a minor experiment had expensive
repercussions in fuel consumption due to insufficient
validation prior to the execution of the experiment.

Using the AFF-toolbox, a transfer from the current
relative orbit to the initial conditions of the experiment
was calculated and uploaded to Mango only one
passage later. At the cost of a reasonable amount of
delta-V the maneuver could be executed within one
orbit and the primary experiment could be restarted
only 2 orbits after the anomaly was first detected. The
actual flight data of these hours can be seen in figure
13.

The experiment was set up to investigate the behavior
of the navigation during GPS antenna switches as either
satellite rotates. In-flight experience has shown that
there are jumps in the navigation as the antennae are
switched; a potentially serious issue for proximity
operations where even small jumps in navigation could
have serious consequences.
The objective of the experiment was to perform
rotations of Mango, disabling the GPS input filter for
short periods where the antenna switch would occur. As
the experiment was not in the original timeline it was
scheduled to be performed at the end of the week, inbetween two other experiments.

200

0

Due to a minor anomaly at the end of the execution of
the previous experiment operations for the night were
extended for an additional passage in order to configure
the system back to default configuration. This passage
would occur about 10 minutes after the first of the
antenna-switch experiments.
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At the start of the passage, Mango had fallen to Safe
Celestial and was thrusting significantly. The cause was
found to be the relative navigation indicating a distance
of exactly 0. As this was clearly not a reasonable result
the navigation filter was reinitiated and at the end of the
passage relative navigation was re-established, showing
a relative drift of 5km/orbit.

Figure 13, Relative distance (along-track, crosstrack & radial [m]), flight results;
A denotes experiment start, B time of anomaly, C
start of transfer and D is restart of experiment
The rest of the primary experiment could be carried out
without any issues. Subsequent analysis identified the
issue with the secondary experiment, which could be
corrected and then be re-run at a later time.

On the following passage Safe Orbit Guidance had
attempted to stop the drift and almost succeeded before
the system TTIM had shut down the thruster system due
to the extremely large amount of thrusting performed.
During the passage the hydrazine system was brought
back online and the rest of the platform was checked to
be in good order.

As the experiment was the last to occur before a
weekend without any experiments planned it was
allowed to proceed for the extra 4 hours needed to
finish, meaning that the overall mission timeline was
not affected at all due to the rapid recovery.

Pokrupa

One additional passage later, the drift had been
completely stopped, but the orbit was very different
from what would be desired with a maximum distance
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of almost 15km and large radial and cross-track
components as can be seen in figure 14.

OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE
Open- and Closed-loop experiments
Throughout the Prisma Basic Mission both open and
closed-loop
experiments
have
taken
place.
Operationally the experience with the two types has
differed greatly with regards to experiment preparation,
validation and execution.
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0

In general the closed loop experiments have had a
greater deal of operational maturity, very much due to
the simulation campaigns. By their very nature these
experiments require less interaction during their
execution as the entire point of them is to demonstrate
autonomy.
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The operational difficulty with the closed-loop
experiments has been in the configuration. This has
included things such as updating default values used
onboard and configuring FDIR limits which may
otherwise be violated during the course of the
experiment such as the collision detector. This has been
especially true for proximity operations, where
additional activities such as DVS imaging are
commonly requested by the experimenter.

Figure 14, Relative position (along-track, cross-track
& radial [m]) during critical anomaly
The following day a transfer back to a more normal
relative orbit was performed. As no experiments were
scheduled during the weekend the overall mission
timeline was not affected, though a very large amount
of delta-V was consumed, both during the anomaly
itself and for the transfer back.

Open-loop experiments tend to require even more
configuration during the preparation for the execution.
In this case it has more to do with circumventing
onboard functions which may autonomously interfere
with the experiment if this is not prevented. It also
includes configuration of the orbit and attitude of the
spacecraft to serve the experiment. There are most
commonly performed using already tested closed-loop
functions such as AFF.

Due to the severity of the anomaly (it was classified as
critical; risk of mission loss) a larger investigation into
the cause was made. Several issues were identified, but
the primary factor was the lack of proper validation of
the experiment. A simulation of the experiment would
have shown that disabling of the GPS input filter would
cause serious issues problems for the navigation and the
experiment as a whole should not have been performed.

Where the two types of experiments differ most
operationally is the required amount of commanding.
Closed loop experiments strive to minimize the amount
of ground commands, allowing on-board software to
perform most configurations and commanding. The
open-loop experiments are quite the opposite, with
large amounts of commands needing upload. The table
below indicates the typical amount of commanding
used for the different experiment types.

Safeguards have been implemented in the software to
prevent similar situations from occurring again. An
additional sanity check for the relative distance has
been introduced where the navigation is marked as
invalid if the distance is identical to 0m. Other
measures were also implemented, both in the software
and in the operational routines.
The issue of the GPS antenna switched has since been
improved by software updates, though the performance
is not yet sufficient for close proximity operations. A
workaround was implemented where antenna switching
is prevented and instead using the fact that the backplate of the active antenna actually does allow GPS
reception. This approach has allowed repeated close
proximity operations down to distances of 2m.

Pokrupa
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Up to the point of writing a total of 8 software patches
have been performed on Mango, but only 3 for Tango.
One additional patch is currently in the process of
upload. Figure 15 shows that the timing for software
updates for Mango is very spread out in time, some
versions only being used for a few days while others
lasting months.

Experiment

Typical
Command
load

Typical
experiment
length

Type of
experiment

AFF

10-20 cmds

1-3 days

Closed-loop

PROX GPS

5-10 cmds

1-3 orbits

Closed-loop

FFRF sensor
validation

700-1000 cmds

1-2 days

Open-loop

HPGP

200-300 cmds

1 orbit

Open-loop

Prima

50-75 cmds

12-24 hrs

Open-loop

CNES GNC

50-100 cmds

1-3 days

Closed-loop

DLR AFC

5-10 cmds

2-3 days

Closed-loop

ARV

20-30 cmds

1-2 days

Closed-loop

Anomaly database analysis

DVS

10-20 cmds

1 orbit

Open-loop

Microthrusters

800-1000 cmds

1 orbit

Open-loop

As a result of the experimental nature of the mission,
anomalies and inconsistencies are encountered.
Although, in comparison to other demonstration or
science missions, the total number of anomalies of all
nature is relatively low.

Of the nine software patches performed to date 4 have
been initiated by experimenter software updates and 5
are due to platform bugs discovered during flight.

Table 7, Experiment commanding
It is worth mentioning that several of the experiments
perform multiple activities in the same upload: An AFF
experiment of 20 commands will perform several orbit
reconfigurations and a FFRF sensor validation sequence
will do large amounts of advanced manual attitude
rotations, requiring a significant amount of
commanding.

Despite these events, the spacecraft robustness and
autonomy has resulted in the fact that all 38 experiment
slots have been successfully completed (with exception
of the full demonstration of micropropulsion
experiment), and the mission schedule has been ontime. Prisma has now even planned for mission and
experiment extensions well in to 2012.

In-orbit software updates

An online anomaly log has been kept using the Hansoft
tool, allowing anyone on the project team (mission
control, support engineers, project managers) to enter
anomalies as they occur. They are categorized,
discussed, tracked and eventually closed by action or
response. From this, a high level assessment of the
nature of events can be made. This is presented below,
for data from launch up to 14th May, 2011.

As a large part of the mission is focused on trying
different algorithms for formation flying patching of the
fight software while in orbit has always been in the
planning. As new parts of the flight code are tried
during different experiments new software bugs will be
identified. At times these will cause experiments to fail,
at which point an anomaly report will be generated to
track the issue. At other times post-analysis of
experiment results will show ways of tuning to improve
performance and reliability. Both will eventually result
in a new software version being built and tested onground before being uploaded to the spacecraft.

Anomalies are given one of four severities: Critical –
potential loss of mission, Major – potential loss of
experiment, Average – potential loss of performance,
Minor – low consequence.
A breakdown of the anomalies by function can be made
(figure 16), and here it is clear that as a result of the
complexity of formation operation, 25% of the
anomalies are related to Experiments and 25% related
to GNC and Systems. All other subsystem anomalies
are as would be expected for a smallsat demonstration
or science mission.

S/w minor version

6.18
6.15
6.12
6.9

With 50% of the anomalies related in some form or
another to the experimental formation flight of two
spacecraft, the nominal Mission Control team of three
people (Director, GNC expert, Operator) relies heavily
on a stable and robust autonomy of the spacecraft.

6.6
6.3
0

100
200
Days since launch

300

Figure 15, Software version history for Mango
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Figure 17, Persons/24hrs on the operations team
The above data in Figure 17 agrees very well with the
original operations principal that was foreseen for two
shifts (Table 3):

Figure 16, Anomalies per function
By sorting over segments (operator, ground, space and
experiment), it becomes very clear that operations and
ground support learn quickly from mistakes in the first
four months of operation, while as the spacecraft and
experiment related errors are still uncovered as more
difficult functions are tested. It should be noted that the
space segment anomalies include those from the
complex GNC functions.

1 manager + 2 flight directors + 2 GNC experts + 1
operator + 0.5 tech support = 6.5 persons per day,
covering two shifts.
The result is fast, flexible and responsive team that has
allowed for maintenance of the demanding timeline,
even in the event of anomalies.
Interaction to
experimenters and their requests is kept focused and
changes or decisions can be made quickly, in some
cases in just a matter of one orbit.

In most Experiment and GNC related anomalies, the
spacecraft have autonomously detected and reacted to
the situation, placing themselves in a safe relative
“wait” state, allowing the team to assess and react
accordingly. For example, many anomalies which have
occurred on a weekend, unmanned, have been assessed
only on the following Monday.

This has also been highly appreciated by the project
experimenters who have benefited from the efficiency
and responsiveness, as stated by CNES, for example:
“This proximity [of Flight Director, GNC Expert,
Operator and Experimenter] allowed a better
reactiveness in presence of anomalies that proved to be
a key element in the respect of the timeline.”14

Operations team size
The tight timeline of continuous around-the-clock
activities shown in Figure 2 above is compounded by
the fact that the formation is nearly always in a state of
dynamic change. This is clearly demanding on the
operations team, yet as a result of migrating a core of
the original design, integration and test members of the
project to the operations team, a very lean and efficient
daily operations could be achieved.

“The involvement of the same engineers from system
design to its operation in space (made possible by the
development approach and the specific validation &
monitoring tools) proved to be a key factor in the
experiment success.”14
LESSONS LEARNED

Below is a summary of the size of the operations team
from Tango separation to May 2011. Unsurprisingly,
Tango separation involved considerable support, but
this was quickly ramped down to an average of 6
persons per day, covering two shifts, up until handover
to GSOC in March 2011. So in short, at any one time
on average, there were no more than 3 people operating
this complex mission.

Pokrupa

Value of simulation
A high degree of confidence in the Safe Orbit Guidance
and collision detector has allowed experiments in
higher modes to take increased risks, pushing the
performance of these modes further and thus collecting
more valuable data. This confidence would not have
been possible without the extensive simulation and test
campaigns performed during the development phase.
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This also applies to the rest of the experiments; a highfidelity simulator such as SATSIM has given all
experimenters the possibility to test their flight-code
both using the faster than real-time simulator and on the
real-time, hardware-in-the-loop, simulator to verify how
the software will interact with the actual flight
processor and, during the AIV phase, the full
spacecraft.

Within Prisma, autonomy has often been employed as a
layer of abstraction to the hardware, meaning that there
are high-level commands for performing most actions
on-board. In many cases this has greatly aided
operations, though this abstraction does pose risks and
can hinder certain operations.
One such case is during the commissioning phase,
where the focus of activities is often more hardware
related than software. The abstraction layer can at this
time become a hindrance to operations, requiring a
great deal more effort to perform activities which
should be fairly straight forward. One example is the
simple act of powering up a unit for the first time. On a
hardware level this is simply a matter of a single oncommand, but with a high level of autonomy and FDIR
the process may become significantly more complicated
where autonomy has to be fooled to allow the unit to be
switched on and FDIR be disabled so that no recoveries
are performed if the unit is not yet prepared for nominal
operations.

The simulation results have proven to be very reliable,
with only small deviations from actual flight results.
Figure 18 shows a comparison of the delta-V
consumption for one experiment.

Autonomy and operability
The operational phase of Prisma has shown that a large
degree of autonomy can significantly simplify
operations. High confidence in the space segment has
meant that during less active periods, such as weekends,
it has been safe to leave the spacecraft in a safe relative
orbit, usually in AFF, with the only ground monitoring
being done remotely by an on-call engineer. In fact, one
of the key design requirements for the mission was for
full autonomy over at least 3 days without commanding
from ground.

Figure 18, Simulated (red) vs Actual dV(blue)
performed15
For this case the difference was on the order of 2%,
most of which can be explained by the fact that the
simulator assumes a higher drag than what the
spacecraft actually experiences in orbit.

The passive formation flying experiments require very
little of the operations team, the only input from ground
for these experiments were passage planning and
weekly TLE uploads. Most of these experiments were
even left unsupervised for shorter periods of time,
completely trusting the autonomy to control the
spacecraft.

Continued use of both versions of the simulator
throughout the operational phase has increased the
responsiveness and flexibility of the operations team.
Having near instant access to the simulator has meant
quick validation of both experiments and flight
procedures, greatly increasing the overall success of the
mission.

In contrast the forced motion experiments required
more in the form of monitoring. This is primarily not
because of less autonomy, but rather due to the inherent
risk of proximity operations. Additionally these
experiments usually have more in the line of passenger
experiments, requiring more from the operations team.

Limitations of autonomy
While a high degree of on-board autonomy greatly aids
the operability of the space-segment it is important to
be aware of the boundaries of that autonomy. It is
difficult to design for every eventuality and once the
boundaries of the autonomy are being pushed
operations become significantly harder. This can
happen when mission requirements change during the
course of operations, but also if situations arise that
have not been considered in the original design.
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When testing out new functionality observability is
always important and even more so when it comes to
autonomous systems. There is a very strong desire to
view all the steps leading to any given autonomous
decision to be able to track any anomalous behaviour.
The Prisma spacecraft database contains some 12000
telemetry parameters which may be downloaded from
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the space segment, but still there are functions that have
not been possible to monitor in a completely
satisfactory way, leading to a certain amount of
frustration.

handover requires exact match in post and pre
conditions, and without stable operation of the two
sensors simultaneously, this becomes difficult. The
effort to match sensor performance becomes
considerable and has yet to be achieved.

An experimental technology demonstrator such as
Prisma will by its nature require more operational
support of what would normally be considered platform
or routine operations. Implementing similar autonomy
on future mission would hopefully require even less in
the form of ground monitoring and commanding.

CONCLUSIONS

Time to recovery

The Prisma mission has, during its first year in orbit,
accomplished nearly all mission objectives, clearly
demonstrating the value of on-board autonomy. By
implementing a high degree of autonomy on both space
and ground segments, the demanding programmatics of
this experimental mission could be maintained, while
also keeping an aggressive mission timeline. By
employing an operational team with lengthy design and
testing heritage, the daily operations have been efficient
and agile allowing a relatively large amount of
experiments to take place in a short period.

It has become clear that in order to maintain the tight
timeline and a responsive interaction with the partner
experimenters, timely reaction to events is critical.
Autonomy has provided a “safe net” that allows for the
operations team to focus on the next steps rather than
recovery actions, as typically the spacecraft have
recovered themselves (safe orbit/orientation, eliminated
relative drift, and simply waiting for the next objective).

As a result of this affectivity and success, the nominal
mission will be completed on schedule by August 2011
and with ~50 m/s of remaining dV. It is for this reason
that the Prisma team invites other organizations,
institutes and agencies to suggest experiments and to
participate in the mission extension. A number of
extension experiments have already been planned, but a
list of potential considerations are:

It is, however, important to note that autonomy will not
always ease operations; operations outside the original
scope of the mission will instead require more effort
due to the fact that the on-board autonomy will have to
be either worked around or disabled completely.








The small and experienced operations team has allowed
for decisive and quick decisions and operations. The
result is often recovery periods in the order of only 1-3
orbits after an anomaly. Unplanned dV maneuvers
have been identified, planned and executed in one
single orbit, which in comparison to many missions can
often take 24-48 hours.



This means that overall timeline is rarely affected by
anomalies, since nominal operations are typically
resumed after ~90 minutes.



After 2012 Mango will leave Tango permanently, after
which a different set of experiments may be considered:

Autonomous handover between sensor types
Part of the mission goals was to demonstrate
autonomous switching of relative position sensors, as in
for example the far range approach to Tango. Ideally
this could be a handover from GPS at large distance to
the Close Range VBS camera or from Far Range to
Close Range camera.






This has proven to be significantly more difficult than
expected, since the final performance of each of the
sensors must be very well understood and tested. The
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All on-board experiments
Ground based or supported experiments
Related to space situational awareness (SSA)
Autonomous FF and relative maneuvers
Automated checkout and planning
Inspection, servicing, repair, 3D proximity
operations
Use of both Mango and Tango or
independently
Focus on GNC algorithms
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SSA experiments (open definition of SSA)
Attitude control experiments
Drag-based FF and relative maneuvers, lower
altitudes
RDV/inspection
of
a
non-cooperative
neighbouring target object (S/C or debris)
Focus on GNC algorithms
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Figure 19, In-flight image of Tango, taken using the Techno Systems DVS camera from Mango at a 20m
relative distance (20th October, 2010)
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